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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Defendant appeals from judgment in plaintiff's 
favor of $10,194.63 damages for the compression frac-
of the second lumbar vertebra sustained while 
he was a passenger on a snowmobile being operated 
in defendant's business. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOvVER COURT 
Plaintiff's case was tried to a jury, issues were 
submitted on instructions by the court, and the judg-
ment of $10,194.63 was rendered by the jury. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks a determination as a matter of 
law that plaintiff is not entitled to recover the judg-
ment or that the amount of the judgment is excessive 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff cannot agree that the Statement of Facts 
as contained in defendant's Brief is fair. 
Plaintiff, it was undisputed, was a business guest 
of the defendant and was at Alta for the purpose of 
taking pictures of their snowmobile, using a camera 
which was in their line of products. See Exhibit P-12 
for an illustration of some of the pictures taken 
plaintiff. 
The snowmobile was being driven by David Big-
ler, a Vice-President of defendant. CR. 166). He was 
familiar with the area over which the snowmobile 
was to be driven and had_ been to the area the prior 
week. He observed that there was a hump of snu\,-
blocking the service road created by snov,- that had 
been pushed in from the road belovv. CR. 167) 
He observed that the hump was there and that he 
had to go around the edge of it in order to go up 
beyond the automobile traveled portion of the road. 
CR. 167-168) Plaintiff rode on the sno\Nmobile sitting 
on the seat behind the driver and had no control over 
the way the vehicle was operated and_ could not see 
exactly where it was being driven. Mr. Bigler in-
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\f'11dl"d to drive the snowmobile off the jump when 
iw came back with the plaintiff riding on it., and 
::1c •.tally drove it off the top of the hump at 15 to 20 
1niks an hour. He estimated that the snowmobile 
jumped 12 to 15 inches. (R. 168) Mr. Woodruff, a 
1Yitness vvho was below vvatching the snowmobile 
come down over the hump, estimated that it jumped 
l 0 to 12 feet across through the air. ( R. 159) Bigler 
came down over the jump a second time and negoti-
ntecl it without the snowmobile leaving the ground, 
and this time he estimates that his speed when going 
over the hump was approximately 5 miles an hour. 
1 R. 169 l He also stated that it was not necessary to 
go over the hump at all, that he could have sneaked 
around the side. rn. 169) The snowmobile has no 
absorbers. The driver stands up, holding the 
steering handles so that he can absorb the shock of 
driving over rough terrain. lR. 170). He testified 
that he did not intend to jump the snowmobile, 
1 R. 172), and in his opinion, it jumped only 3 to 4 
feet. Following the jump, Bigler landed on top of 
plaintiff, lighting on his stomach area, and the back 
of the machine caught the plaintiff in the middle of 
the hack and his head was throvvn back ( R. 17 3). 
Following the injury to Mr. Ujifusa, Bigler tested the 
machine over the hump, and with the speed of the 
machine wide open, at approximately 35 miles an 
hour. it jumped off the hump a distance of 12 feet 
(R. 173). 
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Bigler did not intend to jump the snowmobilP 
since he had two people on it, and the individual in 
back doesn't have much balance and can be thro\1 11 
anyvYhere if you intentionally jump the machine fast 
with two people on it. Bigler did not advise plailltiff 
that he intended to jump the machine nor tell him 
to take any extra precautions CR. 173-17+>. 
Plaintiff suffered immediate pain and injury fol-
lowing the jump as described by witness Bigler, am! 
slid off the snowmobile into the snow and laid there. 
\Vitness Woodruff thought he had the ,,·ind knocked 
out of his lungs temporarily. After he had laid then• 
for 60 seconds or so, they wondered why he didn't 
get up, and this went on for four or five minutes. 
They finally removed him from the scene, and he 
laid in the car for 15 to 20 minutes. ( R. 60 ! Plaintiff 
was able to take the pictures required after the 20 
minute interval, and after he returned home 011 thl' 
evening of December 20th, consulted Dr. Robe1·t II. 
Lamb. Dr. Lamb x-rayed plaintiff and diagnosed hi' 
injuries as a compression facture of the second lum-
bar vertebra. <R. 104> A compression fracturt> 
caused, on occasion, by a person being doubled oYer 
and having a weight fall on him, ( R. 107l, or from 
falling from a height and landing 011 his feet. Tl1e 
X-rays, Dr. Lamb testified, indicated that there 
some change in the intervertebrnl disc itself as show11 
by the rough edges betvveen the vPrtebnH'. CR. 110 1 
Dr. Lamb recomrnl'nded that IVIr. lljifusa go into tlw 
Jvi,pital because of the pain, where he could be made 
:nnre comfortable sooner if he stayed off his feet. 
: 'n\\·ever, plaintiff's business demands were such that 
lw could not go to the hospital, and so the doctor put 
him in a three point brace, giving pressure in the 
upper chest and on the surfaces of the bone below 
an<l at the micldle of the back, extending the back 
as much as possible. (R. 113-114). Plaintiff wore the 
brace for 70 days, to March 1st (R. 114). Dr. Lamb 
examined plaintiff on the 17th day of April, 1969 
and '"'as of the opinion that he would continue to 
c.uffer discomfort in the back, soreness. in his back, 
especially on quick motions or twisted motions, more 
than on flexion or extension of the spine, and on that 
day no essential change in the configuration of the 
second lumbar vertebra had occurred except that the 
healing process had taken place (R. 115). Dr. Lamb 
was of the opinion that degenerative changes in the 
area would take place and that it was just a matter 
of how much pain plaintiff was willing to tolerate-
when the pain became intolerable to him, a fusion 
could be carried out at that time (R. 116). Dr. 
Lamb rated the plaintiff as having a 10% permanent 
partial disability of the spine, the disability being in 
the nature of soreness, discomfort, especially on 
motions of twisting of the spine CR. 117). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT CORRECTLY TH1\ 1 
ASSUMPTION OF RISK SHOULD NOT BE SUB-
MITTED TO THE JURY, BUT DID SUBMIT THE 
QUESTION OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
This court, in two very recent decisions, has care-
fully set forth the principles which govern the sub-
mission to a jury of the question of assumption of 
risk, and has also differentiated between assumpti.on 
of risk and contributory negligence. In Johnson r. 
i11aynard, 9 Utah 2d 268, 342 P.2d 884, the court 
cussed assumption of risk at considerable length. 
pointing out that this doctrine developed originally· 
in the cases where it was necessary to protect em-
ployers, and was designed to insulate the employers 
as much as possible from bearing the cost of huma11 
overhead (Utah, P. 272). The court then established 
the principle Applicable in the following language. 
"The fundAmental conside1·ation underlying it 
is that one should not be permitted to know-
ingly and voluntarily incur an obvious risk of 
personAl harm when he has the ability to 
avoid doing so, and then hold another re-
sponsible for his injury. Its essential elements 
are: knowledge of a danger and a free and 
voluntary consent to assurne it." 
In the case at bar, there is a complete lacking of 
the essential elements stated in Johnson l'. l\Iaynard 
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1 -upra). There was no showing that the plaintiff had 
h1owledge that the defendant intended to drive the 
'-llOvYmobile over the hump and make it jump, and 
11ot having such kno\veldge, there was no free 
and voluntary consent. vVitness Bigler testified 
that it was not necessary to go over the hump, 
that he could go around it, it was not necessary to 
go over it at the speed with which he went over it, 
and that he could negotiate it at five miles an hour 
\Yithout it jumping at all. He specifically testified 
that he did not warn plaintiff that he intended to go 
over the jump nor advise him as to precautions he 
take to safeguard himself from injury. 
This is a case of the operator of the snowmobile 
unnecessarily going over the hump, going over it at 
a high rate of speed in excess of the speed with which 
it could be reasonably and safely negotiated. These 
acts of negligence, defendant could not anticipate, let 
alone know were about to occur. 
The court submitted the plaintiff's case to the 
jur)', advising them that if the plaintiff was contribu-
torily negligent, he could not recover. 
The court, in Instruction No. 9, submitted defend-
;:infs negligence in permitting the snowmobile to go 
o\'er the drop or jump, and stated that defendant 
ronld not recover if he himself was negligent CR. 55). 
Again, in Instruction No. 10, the court submitted the 
nPgligence of ddemlant in failing to keep a lookout 
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for conditions of the surface over which the sno\\-
mobile was operated, and again advised the jury that 
if plaintiff himself was negligent, he could rn:t 
recover CR. 56). In Instruction No. 11, the court sub-
mitted the defendant's negligence in operating at a 
speed which was unsafe, and advised the jury for 
the third time that the plaintiff could not recover if 
he were contributorily negligent CR. 5 7). 
In Instruction No. 12, the court added a fourth 
instruction to the jury that the passenger must exer-
cise reasonable care for his own safety, and that if 
he failed to exercise such care, he could not recover 
from the operator. The language of Instruction No. 
12 is particularly applicable and is as follows: 
"So long as a passenger does exercise ordinary 
care for his own safety, and in the absence of 
appearances that caution him or would cau-
tion a reasonably prudent person in like posi-
tion, he has a right to assume that the opera-
tor of the vehicle in which he is a passeng('r 
will perform all the duties required of such 
operator an cl vvill exercise reasona hle care 
and caution to provide him with a safe trip." 
CR. 58) 
It is the position of plaintiff that this language 
submitted to the jury a carefully and fairly vvorcl('d 
instruction presenting the issues on vvhich they v\·err 
to deliberate, and that clefendant could not, under 
any circumstances, have been prejudiced by the 
court's instrnctions. 
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The court also instructed the jury on unavoidable 
or inevitable accidents in Instruction No. 13, ancl 
;,(lvised them that if the acddent was an unavoidable 
oi' inevitable accident, their verdict should be for 
defendant (R. )9 ! . 
It is plaintiff's position that the kind of negligence 
\Yhich caused him to be injured could not have been 
011ticipated and was not inherent in a ride up ·CH' 
down the hill in a snowmobile. The injury resulted 
from the operator's failure to keep the vehicle operat-
i11g at a speed which was reasonable considering the 
contour over which he intentionally drove the vehicle 
;rnd which he admitted could be safely traversed. He 
could have directed it so as to avoid even the necessity 
of going over the hump or jump. 
This court, in the recent case of Ei 1ans v. Stuart, 
17 Utah 2d 308, +10 P.2d 999, stated that assumption 
of risk, while closely related to contributory negli-
gence, is not identical with it, and again recited the 
mle set forth in ,Waynard v. Johnson, supra, that the 
risk to be assumed must be one \Yhich is of a known 
danger and there must be a reasonable opportunity 
to make an alternative choice (Utah, P. 312). The 
danger causing injury to plaintiff was not known, 
;md there obviously wss no alternative choice since 
he had no knowledge of the danger. 
The most recent case discussing the doctrine of 
assumption of risk is Hindmarsh Z'. 0. P. Skagr;s Food-
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liner, 21 Utah 2d 413, 446 P.2d 410. The court there 
made the following statement concerning the doc-
trine .of assumption of risk: 
"The doctrine of assumption of risk is but a 
specialized aspect of the defense of contribu-
tory negligence. This court has repeatedly 
declared the law in that respect: that it 
applies only where the plaintiff knew of and 
appreciated a danger, and had a reasonable 
opp.ortunity to make an alternative choice, 
but nevertheless voluntarily exposed himself 
to the danger in question. It is not shown 
here that the plaintiff had any such knowl-
edge, nor a reasonable opportunity to make 
an alternative choice. Therefore, that doc-
trine does not entitle the defendant to the 
relief it seeks here." 
It is respectfully submitted that the la\Y as set 
forth in the cases quoted, clearly illustrate that the 
doctrine of assumption of risk was not applicable to 
the facts as shown by the evidence, and the court cor-
rectly submitted the case to the jury on the doctri11<' 
of negligence and plaintiff's contributory negligenc<'. 
The court's instructions fully and carefully submittC'd 
t.o the jury for its determination the issues presented 
by the evidence, and the ver<lict should be upheld. 
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POL'\'T II 
Tl lE DAIVIAGES A \YARDED BY THE .JURY 
\\'ERE MODEST IN AMOCNT, CONSIDERING 
Tl IE PERlVIANENT INJURY SUFFERED BY 
PLAINTIFF. 
Plaintiff suffr.red a compression fracture of th<' 
lumhar v<'rtPbra, \vhich is a permanent injury. 
a11d as has hecn clearly outlined in the statement of 
forts, with referPnc<' to Dr. Lamb's testimony, a com-
prPssion fracture never heals. The vertebra itself 
rPmains in a compr<'ssed state for the balance of an 
injured 1wrson's life. and no surgical intervention to 
the fracture is justified. 
This kind of injury, giving a permanent disability 
of 1 O"u, estimated Dr. Lamb, means that Mr. 
t:jifusa will suffer the balance of his life. 
1rns that he was born 011 :\fay 26. 192 5, and at the 
time of trial would have been t-t- years old (R. 128). 
Plaintiff's business as a commercial photographer 
n•quired him to engage in a great d('al of physical 
activity, and for t\vo months following his injury he 
was not able to do the ordinary work that the job 
n'quired. He had to hire a helper to take his heavy 
canwras and other equipment around with him 
1 R. 1 H). He testified that the back is painful, is con-
stant. and is comparable to a constant toothache 
<R. 1·+5l. 
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Plaintiff testified that there were a lot of things 
he is not able to do that he did before, and it makes 
it necessary to farm out activities such as weddings. 
He had about five weddings per month whicl1, tri ! 11t 
time of trial, he was still farming out ( R. 1 +ti J. HP 
testified that anything that requires a heavier 
camera, he sends someone else out to do the v\·ork or 
has his work done by other photographers ( R. 1 +6-
147). In addition, the injury restricts his recreational 
activity. He can still fish and bO\'\·l, but can't play 
golf because the pain interferes with his S\Ying ( R. 
1+8). Dr. Lamb testified that plaintiff's condition is 
permanent and that if pain becomes intolerable, it 
would require a fusion operation of the back ( R. 11 () 1. 
There was no dispute of Dr. Lamb's testimony, no 
medical witness was offered by defendant, and there 
was no serious controversion by evidence of the plain-
tiff's testim.ony concerning his injury. It is respect-
fully submitted that there is no basis for a claim 
that the jury was confused or impassioned or that thP 
verdict which tlH1 y gave was the rC'c.ult of passion or 
prejudice. 
The Trial Court passed on thC' motion for rC'duc-
tion and remittitur of the verdict and concluded that 
it was not in excess of what was reasonable. It dC'Jli('d 
the motion made bv defendant. 
This court, in many cases, has examined the ru!P" 
and attempted to set forth the principles \\hich \\Ould 
govern the considen=ition of V('rdits v"'11erf' thf'r(' wns ;1 
12 
clilim either .of excPssiv<'ll('Ss or inadequacy. !·mm all 
ilw cases, it would sef'rn tlrnt th<' co11clusio11 m<Hi<- by 
1""l1«' Crockf'tt i11 thC' case' of Stamp L'. Union fJacifir 
l'ru/.nod Co111pmn-, ) L'tah 2d )CJ7, P.2d 2/(), i11 
liis opinion. are correct statenw11ts oi tlw 
principle's goYPr11i11g judicial consideration of ver-
dict". lIC' statC'd: 
.. The first sw h rul(' is that courts should (•xer-
cise gr('at caution and forlwarancf' in disturb-
ing jury v<'rdicts to the c·1Hl that tlw important 
right of trial by jury is preserved. Moreover, 
after the lower court has given its approval to 
the award bv refusing to set aside or modify 
the verdict, that much additional verity is 
thereby conferred upon it and the appellate 
court, a forti.ori, should lw more reluctant to 
i11terfrre \vith the jwy wrdict and the judg-
ment of the court becaus(' of their advantaged 
positio11 in having first-hand vie\\· of the pro-
ceedings and "ill do so 011lv \\·hen to pennit 
it to stand would \\Ol'k a manifest injustice.'' 
Justice Crockf'tt further differentiates between 
t\Yo kinds of Pxcessiveness in a\vards, those so gross!)· 
(''(CPssive as to shock the consciPnce and indicate 
clPilrl)· that thP verdict resulted from passion, preju-
dice or corruption, or that the jtir)· miscon-
cein'd its function. In such cases the verdict is 
t;1i11tPd with injusticP and a new trial should be 
[!T;111tC'd uncomlitionalh·. It is n·s1wctfull)· submitted 
that 110 such claim of grnss excessive11C'ss would stand 
a11;dysis in thC' prPsC'nt case. It must then he that the 
(lpfr11dant is ch1irning that tlw plaintiffs verdict 1s 
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of the class described by Justice Crockett as follows: 
" ... but where there is an award obviously 
above any reasonable appraisal of the dani-
ages suffered, which may have resulterl iroin 
misconception of evidence, or error in judg-
ment, or undue liberality to the extent that 
the court in fairness and justice cannot permit 
the award to stand in the amount given." 
It is respectfully submitted that after all the 
analysis of the prior decisions of the court is com-
pleted, the statement found in Duffy v. Union Pacific 
R. Co., 118 Utah 82, 218 P.2d 1080, Page 91, is prob-
ably accurate. 
"Previously decided cases are of little value 
fixing present day standards or in assistinp; 
courts in determining excessive awards. Both 
the court and. jury are required to deal wi 1I1 
many unknown factors and a good. guess i-
about the best that can be hoped for. ThP 
permissible minimum and maximum limits 
within vvhich a jury may operate for a give11 
injury are presently far apart and must con-
tinue to be widespread so long as pain and 
suffering must be measured hv money stand-
ards." 
It is respectfully submitter\ that $10, 1 CJ4.63 is not 
an excessive amount to be awarded by a jury for a 
10% permanent partial d.isa bility consisting of a com-
pression fracture of the second lumbar vertebra. 
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CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the jury verdict 
, 1ir, the amount not in excess of reasonable, con-
..,jdering the plaintiff's permanent injury, that defend-
ant had a fair trial and the issues were submitted 
\Yith lawful instructions, and that the judgment of 
the lower court should be affirmed with costs to the 
rlaintiff. 
Respectfully submitted this ________________________ clay of 
--------------------------------------------, 1970. 
DVVIGHT L. KING 
Attorney for Plaintiff and Respondent 
2121 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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